The 'Europeanisation' of data protection law by Lynskey, Orla
  
Orla Lynskey 
The Europeanisation of data protection law 
 





Original citation: Lynskey, Orla (2016) The Europeanisation of data protection law. Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies . ISSN 1528-8870 
 
DOI: 10.1017/cel.2016.15  
 
© 2016 Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/68471/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: November 2016 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. 
Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors 
and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE 
Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not 
engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research 
Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be differences 
between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the publisher’s version 







EU data protection law has, to date, been monitored and enforced in a decentralised way 
by independent supervisory authorities in each Member State. While the independence of 
these supervisory authorities is an essential element of EU data protection law, this 
decentralised governance structure has led to competing claims from supervisory 
authorities regarding the national law applicable to a data processing operation and the 
national authority responsible for enforcing the data protection rules. These competing 
claims, evident in investigations conducted into the data protection compliance of Google 
and Facebook, jeopardise the objectives of the EU data protection regime. The new 
General Data Protection Regulation will revolutionise data protection governance by 
providing for a centralised decision-making body, the European Data Protection Board. 
While this agency will ensure the ‘Europeanisation’ of data protection law, given the 
nature and the extent of this Board’s powers it marks another significant shift in the EU’s 
agency-creating process and must therefore also be considered in its broader EU context.    
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EU data protection legislation – the Data Protection Directive1 – was enacted at a time 
when the Internet was at a nascent stage of its development and the so-called digital 
revolution was just beginning.2 This legislation therefore had the potential to shape the 
emerging digital society and, in particular, to ensure that exponential increases in 
personal data processing did not come at the expense of fundamental rights, such as data 
protection and privacy. Despite this potential, data protection law has, until recently, been 
viewed as ‘marginal and technical’ by legal practitioners, policy-makers, academics and 
industry.3 This perception is nevertheless changing as data protection has been thrust into 
the spotlight for a number of reasons. First, the drastic increase in scale of personal data 
processing has necessarily drawn attention to the legal regime governing its processing. 
Secondly, the legal framework itself has changed: the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty4 in 2009 bolstered the status of data protection within the EU legal order by 
                                                     
* Assistant Professor, Law Department, LSE.  
1 European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/23.  
2 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Google Spain, C- 131/12, EU:C:2013:424, para 13.  
3 Lord Justice Leveson, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press (London, 2012), 999.  
4 European Union (EU), Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community [2007] OJ C306/01. 
providing an explicit legal basis for data protection legislation5 while also rendering the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (the Charter) right to data protection binding on 
Member States as well as EU institutions and bodies. Thirdly, the Court of Justice of the 
EU (the Court) embraced data protection’s recognition as a fundamental right and has set 
out to enhance the effectiveness of this right despite the mounting practical challenges to 
its effectiveness.6 Indeed, the right to data protection has been instrumental in seminal 
judgments such as Volker und Markus Scheke7 and Digital Rights Ireland8, leading 
respectively to the partial annulment and annulment in its entirety of secondary 
legislation incompatible with this right. Finally, as a result of their enhanced relevance in 
a digital era, the EU data protection rules have been the subject of a lengthy and 
contentious reform process that culminated in the adoption of a new General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) in May 2016.9 The GDPR will enter into force in May 
2018, almost six and a half years after the European Commission’s initial proposal.10 
This intensified interest in, and scrutiny of, the substantive elements of EU data 
protection law and policy is a welcome development. However, to date, there has been 
little attention devoted to the governance of data protection law11, save for the oft-
repeated assertion that this body of law is under-enforced.12 This paper therefore focuses 
on data protection law from an institutional perspective and seeks to put data protection 
governance in its EU law context. In particular, it claims that the ‘brand new governance 
model’13 that the GDPR shall introduce will lead to the ‘Europeanisation’ of data 
protection law. As Olsen notes, the term Europeanisation is ‘applied in a number of ways 
to describe a variety of phenomena and processes of change’.14 The predominant 
                                                     
5 Article 16, TFEU (EU, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
[2010] OJ C83/47).   
6 BJ Koops, ‘The Trouble with European Data Protection Law’ (2014) 4 International Data Privacy Law 
250. 
7 Volker und Markus Schecke and Hartmut Eifert, Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, EU:C: 2010:662.  
8 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and Others and 
Kärntner Landesregierung and Others, Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, EU:C: 2014: 238.  
9 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1.  
10 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11 final. 
11  A notable recent addition to this literature is: H Hijmans, The European Union as Guardian of Internet 
Privacy (Springer, 2016), pp. 325-448.  
12  For instance, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) highlights in its report the perceived 
shift in power between individuals and data controllers (who determine the purposes and means of personal 
data processing) which respondents to its surveys was, in part, as a result of the ‘lack of effective 
enforcement of the current regime. CMA, ‘The commercial use of consumer data: Report on the CMA’s 
call for information’, CMA38, June 2015, p 169, para 5.51. The challenges to data protection enforcement 
are outlined by the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS). EDPS, Preliminary Opinion of the 
European Data Protection Supervisor, “Privacy and competitiveness in the age of big data: The interplay 
between data protection, competition law and consumer protection in the Digital Economy”, March 2014, 
paras 28 and 29.  
13 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Statement on the 2016 action plan for the implementation of 
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)’, WP236, 2 Feburary 2016, p 2.  
14 JP Olsen, ‘The Many Faces of Europeanisation’ (2002) 40(5) Journal of Common Market Studies 921, p 
921.  
understanding of ‘Europeanisation’ in the political science doctrine concerns the 
domestic consequences of European integration.15 Radaelli therefore states that:  
 
Europeanisation consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) 
institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 
‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined in EU 
policy, processes and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and 
subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies.16  
 
However, a second strand of Europeanisation doctrine views Europeanisation as the:  
 
‘emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of 
governance, that is, of political, legal and social institutions associated with the 
problem solving that formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks 
specialising in the creation of authoritative European rules’.17  
 
It is in this latter sense that Europeanisation is understood in this paper: the 
institutionalisation at European level of a system of governance with the authority to 
enact European-wide binding rules and to formalise interactions between domestic 
authorities. This paper claims that the GDPR will lead to the ‘Europeanisation’ of data 
protection law. This radical development will be brought about by a shift in the current 
decentralised application of data protection law to a new centralised system of 
enforcement.  
This development of EU data protection law from a decentralised to Europeanised 
framework shall be mapped and its potential implications examined. Section two 
identifies the key characteristics of the current decentralised regime of data protection 
governance. In particular, it, firstly, highlights the role of ‘independent’ national 
supervisory authorities (supervisory authorities) in the data protection governance 
structure and, secondly, suggests that this decentralised structure enables regulatory 
competition between these independent supervisory authorities. This decentralised 
governance model therefore jeopardises one of the objectives of EU data protection law, 
namely the effective protection of individual rights.18 Section three charts and analyses 
the shift from this decentralised model of governance to a centralised institutional 
framework. It highlights how the newly created European Data Protection Board will 
facilitate this shift and puts this transformation in a broader context by identifying its 
potential legal and regulatory ramifications.  
 
II. DECENTRALISED DATA PROTECTION GOVERNANCE  
 
A. The role of ‘independent’ supervisory authorities in data protection law 
                                                     
15 Ibid, p 932.  
16 CM Radaelli, ‘Europeanisation: Solution or Problem?’ (2004) 8 European Integration online papers 
(EIoP), No. 16, p 3.  
17 T Risse, J Caporoso, and M Green Cowles, ‘Europeanisation and Domestic Change. Introduction’ in M 
Cowles, J Caporaso and T Risse (Eds), Transforming Europe: Europeanisation and Domestic Change 
(Cornell University Press, 2001), 3.  
18 See note 1 above, Article 1(1).  
 
Supervisory authorities are the key actors in the current governance system for data 
protection in the EU. Pursuant to the Data Protection Directive, each Member State must 
designate one (or several) public authorities to monitor the application of the data 
protection rules within its territory.19 These supervisory authorities have a wide range of 
powers at their disposal and in carrying out their role are said to act as ‘ombudsman, 
auditor, consultant, educator, policy advisor, negotiator and law enforcer’.20 Irrespective 
of the national law applicable to a data processing operation, each supervisory authority 
is competent to exercise its powers on the territory of its own State and may be asked to 
do so by other Member States.21 Supervisory authorities also cooperate when necessary 
for the performance of their duties.22 A defining feature of supervisory authorities is, 
however, their independence. According to the Directive, supervisory authorities ‘shall 
act with complete independence in exercising the functions entrusted to them’.23 This 
independence is described in the Directive as an ‘essential component’ of the protection 
of individuals24, and this independence must be ‘complete’.25 Yet, the Directive provides 
little guidance on what independence entails: for instance, it is silent as to how 
supervisory authorities are independent, and of whom they are independent. Nor does the 
Directive elaborate on the rationale for this independence. The meaning of independence 
is therefore ‘hard to define’26 and needs to be parsed.  
This lacuna has, to a certain extent, been filled by the Court, which has had the 
opportunity to adjudicate on the concept of independence on several occasions. A number 
of conclusions can be reached on the basis of this jurisprudence: independence includes 
horizontal independence vis-à-vis the State and private parties; independence is broadly 
construed; and, independence is subject to primary law and thus quasi-constitutional 
protection.  
 
1. The relational dimension of independence  
 
Independent regulatory agencies originated in the United States in the late 19th century. 
These agencies were designed to insulate certain public administration duties from the 
two dominant political parties in the US as these parties were viewed as ‘engines of 
inefficiency, corruption and political favoritism in government administration’.27 
Independence therefore corresponded to independence of control by political parties. 
Outside of the US context, independence may not serve similar objectives. This begs the 
question of whom are supervisory authorities independent. It is suggested that their 
                                                     
19 Ibid, Article 28(1).  
20 C Bennett and C Raab, The governance of privacy: Policy instruments in global perspective (MIT Press, 
2006).  
21 See note 1 above, Article 28(6).  
22 Ibid, Article 28(6).  
23 Ibid, Article 28(1).  
24 Ibid, Recital 62.  
25 Ibid, Article 28(1).  
26 T Hüttl, ‘The content of “complete independence” contained in the Data Protection Directive’ (2012) 
2(3) International Data Privacy Law 137, p 138.  
27 M Shapiro, ‘The problems of independent agencies in the United States and the European Union’ (1997) 
4(2) Journal of European Public Policy 276, p 279.  
independence might be broadly conceived in two ways: independence at national level 
(horizontal independence), or independence vis-à-vis EU institutions and agencies 
(vertical independence). Horizontal independence might further be sub-divided to 
determine whether supervisory authorities are independent of state organs, public 
authorities or natural and legal persons.  
The Court’s jurisprudence has repeatedly confirmed the horizontal independence 
of supervisory authorities. The Court first had the opportunity to provide guidance on the 
Directive’s independence criterion in Commission v Germany.28 Pursuant to the German 
system, federal and regional supervisory authorities were divided into two categories: 
those with responsibility for monitoring the application of data protection rules by public 
sector bodies, and those with responsibility for overseeing the compliance of private 
sector bodies and public bodies acting in a market capacity. This latter category – the 
authorities responsible for monitoring compliance by private entities and state entities 
acting in a market capacity – were subject to state scrutiny while authorities overseeing 
public sector bodies were subject to no state oversight and were responsible only to their 
respective parliaments.  
The Commission advocated a broad interpretation of ‘independence’ and argued 
that the state scrutiny of supervisory authorities monitoring the data protection 
compliance of market-based entities was incompatible with the ‘complete independence’ 
of these authorities. Complete independence, according to the Commission, entailed 
freedom from any influence, whether that influence was from other public authorities or 
from outside the administration.29 The Federal Republic of Germany proposed a narrow, 
functional approach pursuant to which supervisory authorities must simply be 
independent of bodies which are under their supervision, and not independent of other 
state scrutiny.30 The Advocate General offered a third approach to defining 
independence. He disagreed with Germany that the supervisory authority must be 
independent only of those entities it was supervising.31 However, in light of the difficulty 
of enumerating all the factors necessary to satisfy the independence condition, he 
preferred to adopt a negative approach and to examine whether the state scrutiny at issue 
breached this condition.32 He suggested that a purposive approach should be taken to 
independence and opined that state oversight serves the purpose of ensuring that 
supervisory authorities act in a rational, lawful and proportionate way thereby promoting 
the objectives of the Directive.33 He therefore opined that the Commission had failed to 
discharge its burden of proving that the state scrutiny had hindered the independence of 
supervisory authorities and jeopardised the attainment of the Directive’s objectives.34 
The Court, like the Advocate General, rejected the narrow construction of 
independence advanced by the German government. It held that independence does not 
exclusively concern ‘the relationship between supervisory authorities and the bodies 
                                                     
28 European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany, C-518/07, EU:C:2010:125.  
29 Ibid, para 15.  
30 Ibid, para 16.  
31 Opinion of Advocate General Mazák in European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany, C-
518/07, EU:C:2009:694, para 22.  
32 Ibid, para 24.  
33 Ibid, para 30.  
34 Ibid, paras 31-35.  
subject to that supervision’.35 Rather, according to the Court, ‘complete independence’ 
necessitates ‘a decision-making power independent of any direct or indirect external 
influence on the supervisory authority’.36 The Court, unlike the Advocate General, did 
not deem it necessary for the Commission to provide evidence that oversight might 
hinder the ability of the supervisory authorities to act with complete independence. 
Rather, it held that ‘the mere risk that scrutinising authorities could exercise a political 
influence over the decisions of the supervisory authorities is enough to hinder the latter 
authorities’ independent performance of their tasks’.37 
The Court affirmed this horizontal independence in Commission v Austria.38 
Austria’s supervisory authority (the DSK) followed the Austrian ‘mixed council’ 
administrative model. It was comprised of six members, five of whom were proposed by 
the Austrian Lander, the President of the Supreme Court and authorities representing 
various professional interests while the sole remaining member – the ‘managing member’ 
– was a lawyer working in the federal public administration. DSK members were 
appointed by the Federal President and the DSK’s office was established by the Federal 
Chancellor, who retained the right to be informed at all time of all aspects of the DSK’s 
work. The Commission initiated infringement proceedings against Austria on the basis 
that this administrative model was incompatible with the independence of supervisory 
authorities. Once again the Court agreed, re-iterating that independence is compromised 
not only by direct influence in the form of instructions but also by any indirect influence 
which is liable to have an effect on a supervisory authority’s decisions.39 Such 
independence was lacking in a system where the managing member in charge of the day-
to-day operations of the DSK is a federal official, and the managing member’s activities 
‘can be supervised by his hierarchical superior’.40  
While it has been suggested that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ global standard for 
independence is undesirable given national cultural and legal specificities41, there is 
doctrinal consensus that horizontal independence of supervisory authorities from organs 
of the state serves a number of legitimate objectives. Such independence should prevent 
the State from acting to pursue political objectives, as occurred when the term of office of 
the Hungarian Data Protection Commissioner was abruptly brought to a premature end in 
the context of a reorganisation of the supervisory authority in 2011.42 Moreover, such 
independence prevents the State from applying data protection law to pursue its self-
interest. In Commission v Germany the Court suggested that the government may have an 
interest in data processing operations if it is contractually involved with a private party 
(for instance, through public-private partnerships) or would like access to private 
                                                     
35 See note 28 above, para 19.   
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid, para 36.  
38 European Commission v Republic of Austria, Case C- 614/10, EU:C:2012:631.   
39 Ibid, para 43.  
40 Ibid, para 48.  
41 Kuner et al suggest that it is necessary to consider ‘the complete legal and political structure of a country 
before determining whether its data protection regulator is independent’ as in some countries a supervisory 
authority will have more ‘clout’ if situated within rather than outside a government ministry. Editorial, ‘The 
Intricacies of Independence’ (2012) 2(1) International Data Privacy Law 1, p 1.  
42 Commission v Hungary, C-288/12, EU:C:2014:237.  
databases to fulfil its functions.43 Furthermore, it might be argued that the placement of a 
supervisory authority within a government ministry may lead to ‘administrative 
supervision’ by the ministry and that this in turn may lead to ‘anticipatory disobedience’ 
by the supervisory authority.44 The Court has confirmed however that the overriding 
objective of such independence is to ensure the reliable and effective oversight of data 
protection compliance and thus to ‘strengthen the protection of individuals and bodies 
affected by the decisions of [supervisory] authorities’.45  
This independence must however be counter-balanced by the accountability of 
supervisory authorities. Szydlo suggests that a failure to ensure such accountability will 
lead to conflicts in Member States with hierarchical administration models, and thus 
breach the national identity clause in Article 4(2) TEU.46 This requirement for oversight 
stems from the idea that in a democratic society there is a chain of delegation of powers 
and corresponding accountability between citizens and political actors (government and 
parliament) and political actors and administrative actors (such as government 
departments or agencies). Political actors, acting as principals, can delegate to agencies, 
acting as agents, but remain ultimately accountable to citizens for agency actions.47 
Supervisory authorities may be ‘accountable’ in various ways ranging from statutory 
accountability (as they must act within defined statutory limits, and follow strict and 
transparent rules in exercising their tasks and powers) to personal accountability (an 
office-holder could be dismissed in cases of serious misconduct). It would also appear 
reasonable to assume that State organs can exercise oversight vis-à-vis supervisory 
authorities, for instance, through reporting obligations at defined intervals, or through 
limited supervision to ensure that a supervisory authority is acting within the confines of 
its mandate and in accordance with its obligations. Judicial oversight constitutes a final 
backstop to ensure the legality of supervisory authority actions and their compliance with 
the State’s international legal obligations.48 Indeed, as Zemánek rightly emphasises, the 
Union law prerequisites of independence:  
 
do not cut national authorities off from their social responsiveness (requirements 
of transparency in public, statutory basis of appointment of the authority’s 
management, competence and accountability vis-à-vis the national parliaments), 
nor from the check of legality (their decisions may be appealed against through 
the national courts).49  
                                                     
43 See note 28 above, para 35.   
44 P Schütz, ‘Comparing formal independence of data protection authorities in selected EU member states’, 
Conference paper for the 4th Biennial ECPR Standing Group for Regulatory Governance Conference 2012, 
p 13. See also, M Szydło, 'Principles underlying independence of national data protection authorities: 
Commission v. Austria' (2013) 50(6) Common Market Law Review 1809, p 1819. 
45 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, C-362/14, EU:C:2015:650,  para 41; note 28 
above, para 25;note 38 above, para 48.  
46 See note 44 above, p 1822.  
47 D Curtin, ‘Holding (Quasi-)Autonomous EU Administrative Actors to Public Account’ (2007)13(4) 
European Law Journal 523,  p 525;  See Schütz note 44 above, p 4.   
48 A Balthasar, ‘“Complete Independence” of National Data Protection Supervisory Authorities – Second 
Try’  (2013) 9(3) Utrecht Law Review 26, 34.  
49 J Zemánek, ‘Case C-518/07, European Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, Judgment of the 
Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 9 March 2010 ECR I-1885 (2012) Common Market Law Review 
1755, p 1767.  
More controversial is the extent of the vertical independence of supervisory 
authorities vis-à-vis EU institutions and agencies. Supervisory authorities have a hybrid 
status in the European legal order in so far as they are ‘attached to constitutional 
frameworks of the Member States as well as to that of the European Union’.50 In Schrems 
the Court recalled the importance of independent supervisory authorities and held that the 
existence of a Commission decision adopted pursuant to the Directive does not preclude 
supervisory authorities from examining the compatibility of the same data processing 
activities with the Directive when they receive a complaint.51 Although, in accordance 
with established EU law, only the Court has jurisdiction to declare EU acts invalid52, 
supervisory authorities are thus ostensibly not bound by the data protection decisions of 
the EU Commission and appear to have some level of vertical independence vis-à-vis EU 
institutions. Whether this vertical independence of supervisory authorities is an essential 
component of data protection law will become a live issue following the entry into force 
of the GDPR, as shall be discussed below.  
 
2. A broad interpretation of the notion of ‘independence’  
 
Beyond the question of ‘relational independence’, that is who supervisory authorities are 
independent of, the Data Protection Directive is also silent as to the requirements of 
independence. The Court has thus far focused on what has been labelled ‘legal’ 
independence – how supervisory authorities are ‘set up and structured’ so as to be free of 
undue interference.53 This ‘legal’ independence incorporates aspects of functional and 
organisational independence and while there is no exhaustive list of the requirements of 
independence, a number of criteria can be deduced from the Court’s jurisprudence.  
First, there should be no direct or indirect external influence on the supervisory 
authority and the supervisory authority should neither take nor seek instructions relating 
to the performance of its duties.54 In practice, this means that the decisions and other 
actions of the supervisory authority cannot be made subject to prior approval or be 
overruled (with the exception of overruling by a court or other pre-established appellate 
body) and that no other entity can ‘decisively influence the supervisory authorities’ 
decisions and other actions, in particular by setting standards for their decisions and 
actions’.55 In finding that the level of independence of German supervisory authorities 
fell short of the requisite standard in Commission v Germany, the Court highlighted that 
the decisions of supervisory authorities could be cancelled and replaced in certain 
circumstances.56 The supervisory authority should therefore have organisational 
independence (for instance, a separate legal personality so that it is not legally part of 
another public body); independent personnel who are not employed by other public 
bodies; and adequate financial and informational resources. The Court elaborated on the 
                                                     
50 H Hijmans, The EU as a constitutional guardian of internet privacy and data protection, PhD thesis, 
University of Amsterdam, 2016, downloaded from UvA-DARE, the institutional repository of the 
University of Amsterdam (UvA), http://hdl.handle.net/11245/2.169421, p 287. 
51 See note 45 above, para 57.  
52 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, C-314/85, EU:C:1987:452.  
53 See note 41 above, p 1.  
54 See note 28 above, para 28.  
55 See note 44 above, p 1818.  
56See note 28 above, para 32.    
financial resources requirement in Commission v Austria.57 Departing from its previous 
findings58, it acknowledged that Member States can, from a budgetary law perspective, 
bring the budgets of supervisory authorities under a specified ministerial department 
provided that the ‘attribution of the necessary equipment and staff’ to the supervisory 
authority does not impede them acting with complete independence.59 Some of these 
elements were lacking in the Austrian DSK, for instance the organisational overlap 
between the DSK and the Federal Chancellery prevented the DSK from ‘being above all 
suspicion of partiality’60 while the Court also highlighted that the right to information of 
the Federal Chancellor was far-reaching and ‘unconditional’.61  
Despite the guidance provided by the Court, several questions remain to be 
clarified. For instance, although the personnel of supervisory authorities must not be 
employed by other public bodies, it is unclear whether this prevents supervisory 
authorities from hiring employees from amongst members of a national civil service. On 
the one hand, it might be argued that close ties with former colleagues in government and 
state bodies would compromise the de facto independence of the supervisory authority.62 
On the other hand, the majority of supervisory authorities are publicly funded bodies and 
supervisory authorities might find it more difficult to attract high calibre candidates if 
they can neither compete with private sector salaries nor recruit from the existing public 
sector pool.63  Such logistical problems may be exacerbated in smaller Member States, 
for instance, Digital Rights Ireland, an Irish civil society organisation, is challenging the 
independence of the Irish supervisory authority on the grounds, amongst others, that ‘the 
Commissioner and all her office’s employees are civil servants’.64  
A further issue on which clarification may be required is whether the 
independence of supervisory authorities is compromised by entering into working 
relationships with private entities. Kuner et al astutely raise this query, highlighting that 
in future ‘there will likely be increased “outsourcing” of compliance and enforcement 
functions to third parties (including, for example, the management of privacy seal 
programmes…) with appropriate supervisory authority supervision.’ They suggest that in 
order for such third-party managed schemes to be effective and credible, the third-parties 
                                                     
57 See note 49 above.  
58 In Commission v Germany (see note 28 above, para 28) the Court held that the Regulation governing data 
processing by the EU Institutions and the Data Protection Directive must be interpreted homogenously as 
they are based on ‘the same general concept’. The Regulation governing data processing by the EU 
institutions provides the EDPS with a separate budget under the general budget of the EU. 
59 See note 38 above, para 58.  
60 Ibid, para 36.  
61 Ibid, para 29.   
62 Schütz, suggests that if supervisory authority officials continue their careers later on in the civil service 
this may be ‘highly problematic in terms of the staffs’ de facto commitment, orientation and willingness to 
comply’.  See note 44 above, p 14.  
63 A notable exception is the UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) which is funded through 
annual notification fees received from data controllers. See: https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/our-
information/income-and-expenditure/ .  
64 E Edwards, ‘Independence of Data Protection Commissioner Questioned’, Irish Times, 28 January 2016. 
Available at: http://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/independence-of-data-protection-
commissioner-questioned-1.2513682 .  
themselves must be ‘seen to enjoy a high level of impartiality and independence from 
both governments and private sector interests’.65  
Of more pressing concern perhaps is the ongoing uncertainty regarding the degree 
of discretion, and thus independence, supervisory authorities enjoy when exercising their 
powers. In particular, the extent of a supervisory authority’s discretion to determine what 
data protection violations to pursue, and how best to remedy these violations, remains 
contested. It would appear that some supervisory authorities wish to take a de minimis 
approach to data protection enforcement. A Dutch tribunal made a reference to the Court 
querying whether such an approach is compatible with the Directive. It asked whether 
supervisory authorities are permitted to set priorities which result in no enforcement 
‘where only an individual or a small group of persons submits a complaint alleging a 
breach of the directive’.66 This reference was unfortunately withdrawn before the Court 
had the opportunity to provide a reply.67 Such a de minimis approach would however 
ostensibly deprive data subjects of their data protection rights pursuant to the EU data 
protection rules and, potentially, their right to an effective remedy in accordance with 
Article 47 of the EU Charter.  
This situation – where a supervisory authority rejects individual or small group 
complaints outright in order to pursue more strategic issues – might be distinguished 
from a situation where enforcement resources are prioritised following a holistic 
assessment of the merits of a particular case. Some supervisory authorities have indicated 
that they may prioritise, or would wish to prioritise, their enforcement resources based on 
the circumstances of each individual complaint. For example, the UK’s Information 
Commissioner’s Office (ICO) may exercise discretion as to whether or not to initiate 
enforcement action against a data controller following a data protection breach. In 
exercising this discretion it considers the severity of the breach, how the data controller 
has dealt with the concerns raised before it and the context of the infringement.68 
Similarly, the Irish Data Protection Commissioner has lamented the diversion of 
resources from systemic and strategic enforcement priorities to deal with individual 
complaints. While recognising that individual complaints may entail embarrassment and 
distress for data subjects, she queried whether each complaint merits a resource intensive 
investigation and decision, particularly when the data controllers concerned had already 
taken steps to remedy their breach. The Commissioner suggested that such formal 
findings may benefit ‘digital ambulance chasers’ rather than individual data subjects.69  
It might be argued that such a resource-sensitive approach to formal enforcement 
– whether used systematically or only on occasion – would put the Irish Data Protection 
Commissioner (and, by analogy, the ICO) ‘on a collision course with the European 
                                                     
65 See note 41 above, p 1.  
66 Request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State (Netherlands), lodged on 24 April 2015 (Case 
C-192/15)[2015] OJ C236/26.   
67 T. D. Rease and P. Wullems v College bescherming persoonsgegevens, C-192/15, EU:C:2015:861.  
68 ICO, ‘How we deal with complaints and concerns: a guide for data controllers’, 1 April 2014. Available 
at: https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1561/how-we-deal-with-complaints-and-concerns-
a-guide-for-data-controllers.pdf .  
69  See note 64 above.   
Commission and the Court’.70 This view could be supported by the Article 29 Working 
Party’s statement that ‘rights granted to the data subject by EU law should be respected 
regardless of the level of the risks which the latter incur through the data processing 
involved’71 and the Court’s finding that an interference with data protection rights does 
not depend on whether there has been any material harm or inconvenience to an 
individual.72 Yet, a supervisory authority may argue to the contrary that rights continue to 
be respected and upheld even when formal enforcement resources are prioritised. Such 
prioritisation may, in fact, lead to a more efficient and effective system of rights 
protection: the data protection rights of individuals are secured through informal channels 
where possible and, where not possible, formal resource-intensive proceedings are 
initiated. The GDPR seems to be support this latter view by leaving the possibility for 
‘amicable settlement’ between controllers and a supervisory authority open. It suggests 
that when a supervisory authority, which should act as the lead authority in the case of 
cross-border processing matters, is dealing with a purely domestic matter, the supervisory 
authority should ‘seek an amicable settlement with the controller’ and then subsequently 
exercise its full range of powers if the amicable settlement proves unsuccessful.73  
 
3. The ‘constitutionalisation’ of independence  
 
The expansive and strict interpretation of the notion of independence by the Court has 
attracted doctrinal debate and criticism.74 First, the legal basis for such an obligation has 
been challenged: Zemánek queries whether ‘the obligation of Member States to exempt 
supervisory authorities from their executive hierarchies [can] be based merely on an act 
of secondary legislation of the Union without its express authorization in the Treaty?’75 
This is particularly so in light of the impact ‘complete independence’ has on existing 
administrative structures and balances of power at State level.76 Furthermore, the Court’s 
interpretation of ‘independence’ has been criticised for failing to differentiate sufficiently 
between oversight of public and private sector data processing activities. Balthasar 
suggests that the ‘institutional safeguards needed for a public authority to “act objectively 
and impartially” with regard to private persons most probably differ fundamentally from 
those needed with regard to other, in particular higher ranking, public authorities’.77 He 
thus implies that the Court has left little leeway to interpret this concept more restrictively 
in future when the oversight by supervisory authorities of private sector processing 
activities is at stake. The desirability of such a distinction between public and private 
sector data processing operations, and the stringency of their oversight, must however be 
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questioned in light of data-sharing and the blurring of boundaries between these two 
sectors.78   
Perhaps the most significant critique of the Court’s stringent interpretation of this 
notion of independence is that it is out of line with other areas of law and thus arbitrarily 
offers data protection an elevated level of protection when compared to other 
fundamental rights. In Commission v Austria the Court dismissed the argument that 
because a supervisory authority is sufficiently independent to satisfy the criteria for 
judicial independence pursuant to Article 267 TFEU, it should satisfy the criteria for 
independence for data protection purposes.79 Instead, it emphasised that the term 
‘complete independence’ must be given an ‘autonomous interpretation’ based on the 
actual wording of the provision and the aims and scheme of the Data Protection 
Directive.80 While it could be argued that a literal interpretation of the term ‘complete 
independence’ necessitates such a broad construction81, it could equally be claimed that, 
taken to its logical conclusion, this strict interpretation leads to an untenable practical 
outcome. As Balthasar highlights, if the independence of courts falls short of that of a 
supervisory authority then judicial review of supervisory authority actions by courts 
would, in itself, indirectly but effectively compromise the independence of supervisory 
authorities.82 Balthasar thus reaches the damning conclusion that the ‘horizontal negative 
impact’ of this strict definition of independence in the data protection context ‘seems to 
be a price which is (too) high for a “premium class” institutional protection of one single 
fundamental right (which does not even belong to the indispensable essence of human 
rights).’83  
It is interesting to note that other rights recognised in the EU Charter, for instance the 
employment rights protected under Title IV or the right to property protected in Article 
17, are subject only to judicial protection and not also to protection by independent 
specialised bodies with the same institutional safeguards as supervisory authorities. 
Furthermore, this facet of the protection of the right to data protection has been given 
primary law status through its incorporation in Article 16(2) TFEU and by anchoring the 
independence of supervisory authorities to the right to data protection. The Court has 
affirmed that the independence of supervisory authorities is derived from primary law.84  
However, one might note that the requirement of ‘complete independence’ of supervisory 
authorities is not visible in the ‘more realistic’ wording of the Charter85, leaving potential 
scope for a less onerous interpretation of the concept of independence in the future.  
 
B. Regulatory arbitrage between independent supervisory authorities  
 
 
A second notable feature of the current system of data protection governance linked, 
albeit perhaps only indirectly, to the independence of supervisory authorities is that there 
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is significant ‘regulatory arbitrage’ between these institutions. Pursuant to the system 
established by the Data Protection Directive, each national supervisory authority is 
responsible for the enforcement of data protection law within its own territory.86 As a 
result, supervisory authorities work, to a large extent, independently of one another and 
of vertical oversight by the European Commission or other EU institutions. Despite its 
name, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) has no centralised power of 
supervision over supervisory authorities: it is responsible solely for ensuring that EU 
institutions and agencies comply with the rules governing personal data processing 
applicable to the EU Institutions.87 Likewise, the Article 29 Working Party, a body 
comprised of a representative of each of the national supervisory authorities, should, 
according to its mandate, act merely in an advisory capacity.88 This lack of centralised 
oversight and coordination of the activities of the supervisory authorities has proven to be 
problematic in two particular ways: it has led, firstly, to suboptimal enforcement of the 
data protection rules in transnational contexts, and, secondly, to regulatory arbitrage 
between independent supervisory authorities who wish to tackle the same data processing 
problems in distinct ways. 
In transnational situations implicating multiple supervisory authorities the current 
decentralised system of enforcement by independent Supervisory authorities has come 
under pressure. This is because cooperation between supervisory authorities is ‘not 
“institutionalised” through clear rules and strict time frames but takes place at a rather 
informal level’.89 This is best illustrated by reference to the response of supervisory 
authorities to Google’s 2012 changes to its privacy policy. Following these changes, 
Google’s distinct privacy policies for each of its services (for instance, services such as 
Gmail, Google +, Google Maps and YouTube) were replaced by a merged privacy policy 
applicable to all Google’s services. While this change had the potential to benefit users 
by providing them with a single comprehensive document outlining Google’s privacy 
policy for all services, it also risked falling foul of data protection principles. 
Google was initially contacted by the Article 29 Working Party prior to the 
enactment of these changes, and asked to stall the roll-out of its new policy while a 
coordinated procedure, led by the French supervisory authority (the Commission 
Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés – CNIL), was undertaken.90 Following this 
initial investigation, during which the CNIL sent Google two questionnaires ‘on behalf of 
the Article 29 Working Party’91, the Article 29 Working Party then composed a letter to 
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Google outlining its main findings.92 In particular, the Article 29 Working Party 
highlighted two main shortcomings of this revised, amalgamated policy. First, it 
suggested that the policy lacked transparency as it provided users with vague and 
incomplete information regarding their personal data processing.93 Secondly, it suggested 
that the aggregation of personal data of Google’s users from across Google’s services 
was incompatible with established data protection principles such as purpose limitation94 
and, in some instances, lacked a legal basis. The Article 29 Working Party therefore set 
out a number of recommendations for Google.95 When Google failed to implement these 
changes after several months, the Article 29 Working Party established a taskforce with 
representatives from six supervisory authorities to consider the privacy policy’s 
compliance with respective national laws. Google then met with representatives of the 
taskforce and identified measures it would take to fulfil the Working Party’s original 
recommendations. Meanwhile, the six supervisory authorities also issued separate data 
protection recommendations to ensure compliance with national data protection rules.96 
The following year, Google was notified by the Article 29 Working Party of a number of 
further recommendations that had been agreed by supervisory authorities.97 Google 
identified steps it would take to address these concerns, while continuing to engage with 
supervisory authorities in order to implement these changes and ensure compliance with 
the domestic rules.98 
This process highlights some of the shortcomings of the current system of 
decentralised enforcement. First, although the Data Protection Directive was enacted as 
an instrument of maximum harmonisation to facilitate the free flow of personal data in 
the EU by limiting national legislative divergences99, this procedure gives the impression 
that data controllers must still comply with distinct laws and enforcement procedures 
across EU Member States. For instance, in the context of this investigation the CNIL 
lamented that, contrary to Google’s suggestion, it had failed to ‘pre-brief’ all authorities, 
and that those that were informed only heard about the changes a few days before they 
were publicly announced.100 Secondly, in the absence of a pan-European regulator to 
enforce the data protection rules, an ad hoc transnational enforcement system involving a 
                                                     
92 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Letter to Google Inc. CEO Larry Page, 16 October 2012, 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/other-
document/files/2012/20121016_letter_to_google_en.pdf .  
93 See note 1 above, Articles 10 and 11.  
94 Article 6(b). According to this principle, data must be collected for specific purposes and cannot be 
processed for other incompatible purposes. 
95 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Appendix: Google Privacy Policy – Main Findings and 
Recommendations, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/other-
document/files/2012/20121016_google_privacy_policy_recommendations_cnil_en.pdf .  
96 For instance, the ICO informed Google that the changes did not comply with the UK Data Protection Act 
1998 and Google therefore implemented changes in two stages, while in dialogue with the ICO, to conform 
to the UK law. ICO, ‘Google to change privacy policy after ICO investigation’, 30 January 2015. Available 
at: https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2015/01/google-to-change-privacy-
policy-after-ico-investigation/ .  
97 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Letter to Google Inc. CEO Larry Page, 23 September 2014, 
Ref. Ares(2014)3113072 - 23/09/2014, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/other-document/files/2014/20140923_letter_on_google_privacy_policy.pdf 
98 For a timeline of the Google investigation see note 96 above.  
99 ASNEF, C-468/10, EU:C:2011:777, para 29.  
100 See note 91 above.  
to-and-fro between supervisory authorities and the Article 29 Working Party was created. 
Therefore, while the Article 29 Working Party originally took the initiative to contact 
Google, it was the supervisory authorities, led by the CNIL, which conducted the 
preliminary investigation before the Article 29 Working Party again took the lead by 
addressing a series of recommendations to Google. However, this ad hoc mechanism 
exposed the weakness of the current enforcement regime. When Google failed to react to 
the Article 29 Working Party’s recommendations, it fell upon the supervisory authorities 
to initiate their formal proceedings against Google. In the absence of a legal basis, 
Google had no obligation to recognise the authority of the Article 29 Working Party or to 
comply with its recommendations. Moreover, the Article 29 Working Party seemingly 
failed to recognise these institutional and substantive limits to harmonisation. For 
instance, the Working Party suggested to Google that it ‘must meet its obligations with 
respect to the European and national data protection legal frameworks’, thereby implying 
that there is a supranational body with the power to apply the rules directly to a private 
entity like Google and that the Data Protection Directive is directly applicable to Google. 
No such supranational body exists while in order to apply the Directive against a private 
party before a national court it would be necessary to prove that the relevant provisions of 
the Directive had direct effect.101    
A further implication of the current enforcement system is that the vertical 
independence of national supervisory authorities from EU institutions and bodies 
facilitates, or at least does little to prevent, regulatory arbitrage between supervisory 
authorities. According to the Data Protection Directive, a Member State’s law applies to a 
data processing operation where the processing is ‘carried out in the context of the 
activities of an establishment of the controller’102 in that State and the national 
supervisory authority is responsible for monitoring ‘the application within its territory of 
the provisions adopted by the Member States pursuant to the Directive’.103 Although 
Article 4 of the Directive, and its relationship with Article 28, ‘has always been shrouded 
in a veil of mystery’104,  these provisions were initially understood to mean that the 
supervisory authority in the place of a data controller’s establishment would be 
competent to monitor the compliance of that data controller with data protection law. 
However, in the Google investigation referred to above, multiple supervisory authorities 
sought to apply their national law to Google and to exercise their enforcement powers. 
The multiple ongoing investigations regarding Facebook’s data processing activities 
reveal similar confusion.  
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Facebook – which has its primary European establishment in Ireland – falls under 
the jurisdiction of the Irish Data Protection Commissioner (DPC) and, consequently, the 
group Europe-v-Facebook105 initially submitted its complaints regarding Facebook’s data 
protection compliance to the Irish DPC.106 The Irish DPC has also audited Facebook’s 
activities in the past107, and approved Facebook’s new Data Use Policy and Terms of 
Service of January 2015 by audit.108 Consensus regarding jurisdiction over transnational 
data processing operations was however lacking. In February 2015 four EU supervisory 
authorities formed a taskforce to investigate these changes to Facebook’s policy while 
continuing to pursue their ongoing domestic probes into Facebook’s data processing 
practices in some cases.109 The Belgian supervisory authority therefore published a 
preliminary report in May 2015 assessing the compatibility of Facebook’s new policy 
with Belgian data protection law.110 It claimed jurisdiction for this assessment in a 
‘recommendation’ by, firstly, asserting that Facebook Inc (established in the USA) rather 
than Facebook Ireland is the data controller.111 It highlighted, for example, that Facebook 
Inc had launched this new policy and that the policy was applicable globally and not 
tailored in any way to comply with EU data protection law.112 Secondly, it noted that 
Facebook Belgium, which is tasked with public policy and legislative and outreach 
initiatives, is a subsidiary of Facebook Inc.113 In Google Spain the Court held that Google 
had a revenue-generating advertising subsidiary established in Spain. In finding that the 
Spanish supervisory authority was competent to oversee Google’s search engine 
activities, the Court held that Google’s search engine activities were activities in the 
context of this establishment and that the search engine activities could not be decoupled 
from the advertising activities.114 The Belgian supervisory authority’s argument was 
therefore that the activities of Facebook’s subsidiary in Belgium were inextricably linked 
to Facebook’s social networking service in an analogous way. It therefore initiated 
litigation against Facebook before its domestic courts, winning its case at first instance. 
However, Facebook’s appeal against this decision on jurisdictional grounds was upheld 
by the Belgian Court of Appeal, which found that the Irish regulator was competent to 
oversee Facebook’s data processing activities in Belgium.115 While some supervisory 
authorities continue to recognise the jurisdiction of the Irish DPC to monitor Facebook’s 
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data protection compliance116, others have clearly sought to challenge this jurisdiction 
leading to regulatory competition between national supervisory authorities. For its part, 
Facebook has on occasion refused to comply with these competing regulatory demands. 
For example, Facebook suggested that the regulators participating in the taskforce to 
investigate its new policy are not empowered to investigate it, and on another occasion 
Facebook refused to answer questions addressed to it by the supervisory authority of 
Hamburg citing a lack of jurisdiction.117  
The Court has been asked to adjudicate on these issues in a preliminary reference 
from Germany in the so-called ‘Facebook fanpages’ case. In this reference, the referring 
court highlights that decisions regarding data processing are taken by a parent company 
that is located outside the EU (Facebook Inc) but that has legally independent 
subsidiaries in the EU. It also acknowledges that according to Facebook’s internal 
allocation of competences, it is Facebook’s Irish subsidiary that is exclusively responsible 
for personal data processing within the EU.118 By its questions, the referring court queries 
whether, in light of this situation, the German supervisory authority can exercise its 
powers of investigation and intervention, and can address orders to Facebook’s German 
subsidiary that sells advertising and promotes marketing measures to German residents. It 
also asks the Court to consider the respective responsibilities of supervisory authorities in 
situations where a first party in one state’s responsibility is engaged as a result of its 
failure to exercise a duty of care by involving a third party in another state in data 
processing operations. In particular, the Court is asked to consider whether the 
supervisory authority responsible for overseeing the first party can conduct its own 
preliminary appraisal of the lawfulness of the processing by a third party although this 
third party is subject to oversight by another state’s supervisory authority. These 
questions go to the heart of the regulatory competition that has, thus far, impeded the 
uniform interpretation and application of the EU data protection rules by seeking to 
delimit more clearly the boundaries between the respective spheres of competence of 
independent supervisory authorities.  
The Court has however already begun to provide guidance on this horizontal 
division of labour between independent supervisory. In Weltimmo119 the Court was asked 
to consider the compatibility with EU law of a fine imposed on Weltimmo by the 
Hungarian supervisory authority. Weltimmo ran a website dealing in Hungarian 
properties but had its registered office in Slovakia. It advertised properties for free for the 
first month, charging a monthly fee thereafter. As a result, many advertisers sought to 
have their advertisements, as well as the personal data processed for these purposes, 
deleted after one month. Weltimmo failed to honour these requests and continued to 
charge these advertisers for its services. When the advertisers failed to pay Weltimmo, it 
provided their personal data to a debt collection agency and, as a result, Weltimmo was 
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fined by the Hungarian supervisory authority for breach of data protection law. 
Weltimmo’s ensuing appeal culminated in the referral of a number of questions regarding 
the applicable law to the Court.  
The Court was asked, in essence, whether Articles 4(1)(a) and 28(1) of the 
Directive must be interpreted as permitting the supervisory authority of one Member 
State to apply its national data protection law to a data controller which is running a 
website dealing in properties in that Member State but whose company is registered in 
another Member State. The Court endorsed a broad interpretation of the applicable law 
provisions. It reiterated that a Member State’s law applies where the processing is 
‘carried out in the context of the activities of an establishment of the controller’.120 It 
noted that the place of establishment is where the ‘real and effective exercise of activity 
through stable arrangements’ takes place and that the legal form of establishment is not 
decisive.121 It also found that any real or effective activity – even minimal – could 
constitute a ‘stable arrangement’122 and that Weltimmo had such an establishment in 
Hungary.123 It held that the online publication of the property owners’ personal data as 
well as the use of those data for invoicing constituted processing taking place in the 
context of the activities pursued by Weltimmo’s establishment in Hungary. Therefore, 
while the Court confirmed in Weltimmo that a supervisory authority cannot exercise its 
supervisory and sanctioning powers when the law applicable is that of another Member 
State124, this territorial restriction was offset by its expansive interpretation of applicable 
law.  
Most recently in Verein für Konsumenteninformation125 the Court was asked, 
inter alia, to provide guidance on the national data protection law applicable in a dispute 
between an Austrian consumer protection group and Amazon EU, which has its legal 
establishment in Luxembourg, regarding transactions concluded on Amazon’s German 
domain name website (www.amazon.de). In its sparse judgment, the Court simply 
recalled its Weltimmo findings that establishment implies the exercise of real and 
effective activity through stable arrangements126 and that processing of personal data 
does not need to be carried out by the establishment but only ‘in the context of the 
activities of the establishment’.127 It therefore left it to the national court to apply its 
conclusion that, in the e-commerce context, data processing is  
 
governed by the law of the Member State to which the undertaking directs its 
activities, if it shown that the undertaking carries out the data processing in 
question in the context of the activities of an establishment situated in that 
Member State.128  
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This conclusion leaves two questions open: first, whether the Court’s logic in Google 
Spain can be applied beyond that factual scenario. It is recalled that in Google Spain the 
Court held that if (non-EU) data processing operations by one subsidiary are inextricably 
linked to the establishment of another (EU-based) subsidiary, the law applicable will be 
that of the establishment irrespective of where processing takes place. Secondly, it fails to 
clarify whether, as is implied by the German supervisory authority in the Facebook 
fanpages case, the law applicable to a data processing operation will be the law of each 
country where a data controller has an effective establishment.  
The Advocate General’s Opinion was, however, more illuminating.129 The 
Advocate General distinguished between two functions of Article 4: first, to determine 
whether the Directive applied at all (as occurred in Google Spain) and, secondly, to 
identify which of the potentially relevant Member State laws applied in a given 
circumstance (as occurred in Weltimmo).130 He recalled that the Directive was founded 
on an idea of mutual trust and that, according to its travaux préparatoires, it seeks to 
prevent the same data processing operation from being governed by the laws of more 
than one Member State.131 In determining the applicable law, it is necessary to have both 
an establishment and data processing in the context of the activities of that establishment. 
The Advocate General opined that this second criterion is decisive where an undertaking 
has establishments in more than one Member State132 and refused to extend the broad 
interpretation of this condition in Google Spain to the facts before him. He distinguished 
Google Spain by suggesting that the Court’s interpretation in that case related to the 
question of whether the relevant legal framework was applicable or not, and was 
motivated by its desire to ‘prevent Google’s processing from escaping the obligations and 
guarantees provided for by the directive’.133 He opined that this case concerned the 
distinct issue of which, among several national laws transposing the directive, is intended 
to govern the data processing operations and thus involves the identification of the 
establishment in the context of whose activities the data processing operations are most 
directly involved.134  
The generous interpretation of the concept of ‘establishment’ adopted by the Court in 
Weltimmo and ‘processing carried out in the context of the activities of an establishment’ 
in Google Spain could therefore both be viewed as an attempt by the Court to ensure that 
data controllers cannot strategically locate their data processing operations in order to 
shelter them from oversight by supervisory authorities, or the application of the data 
protection rules. In this regard, one must agree that ‘it does not seem like an exaggeration 
to say that, to a great extent, it is a concern for the protection of the rights afforded under 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter that has driven the direction of the interpretation’ of the 
Directive’s applicable law provisions.135 As will now be demonstrated, the changes that 
shall be introduced by the GDPR shall consolidate this enforcement process and this 
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fundamental rights protection, thus bringing the ‘Europeanisation’ of data protection law 
one step closer to completion.  
 
 
III. FROM DECENTRALISED TO ‘EUROPEANISED’ GOVERNANCE  
 
 
A. The ‘centralising’ effect of the European Data Protection Board 
 
The GDPR continues to mandate the independence of supervisory authorities. It outlines 
the criteria required for a supervisory authority to be independent in detail thereby 
rendering the ‘general’ independence condition in the Regulation redundant.136 However, 
the GDPR departs significantly from the Directive’s current decentralised data protection 
enforcement regime by complementing the increased substantive harmonisation of data 
protection law it will entail with a new system of governance designed to achieve the 
uniform application of these rules.  
The GDPR, like the Directive, affirms that each supervisory authority shall be 
competent for the performance of its tasks and the exercise of its powers on the territory 
of its own Member State.137 It therefore specifies that only the supervisory authority of a 
relevant Member State is competent when data processing is carried out in order to 
comply with a legal obligation, or is necessary for the performance of a task in the public 
interest or for the exercise of official functions.138 Moreover, where a complaint 
submitted to a supervisory authority relates only to a controller or processor established 
on its territory or substantially affects data subjects only in its Member State, it alone is, 
in principle139, competent to handle such complaints.140 However, the GDPR provides 
that each supervisory authority shall contribute to its consistent application throughout 
the Union and shall thus ‘cooperate with each other and with the Commission’ in 
accordance with Chapter VII governing cooperation and consistency.141  
The GDPR therefore stipulates that in investigations involving cross-border data 
processing, a lead supervisory authority should be designated. The competent lead 
supervisory authority will be the supervisory authority of the main or single 
establishment of the data controller or processor.142 This lead supervisory authority 
becomes the sole interlocutor of the controller or processor regarding its data processing 
operations while continuing to cooperate with other supervisory authorities.143 The lead 
supervisory authority can request other supervisory authorities to carry out investigations 
or monitor the implementation of a measure addressed to a controller/processor 
established in another member state.144 Moreover, the lead supervisor must submit its 
draft decisions to other relevant authorities for their input and takes due account of this 
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input.145 The supervisory authority to which a complaint was lodged can also, of its own 
initiative, submit a draft decision to the lead authority which in turn must take ‘utmost 
account’ of this draft decision.146 Where there is disagreement over a draft decision, and 
the lead authority does not incorporate the objections of another supervisory authority 
into its decision, the lead authority must invoke the GDPR’s ‘consistency mechanism’.147 
The consistency mechanism, as its name suggests, seeks to ensure that consistent 
application of the GDPR throughout the Union.148  
The primary actor in this mechanism is the newly established ‘European Data 
Protection Board’ (EDPB). The EDPB is an official body of the Union with legal 
personality149, composed of the heads of a supervisory authority from each Member State 
and of the EDPS, or their respective representatives.150 The EDPB shall adopt binding 
decisions where the lead authority refuses to incorporate relevant and reasonable 
objections raised by another supervisory authority in its decision.151 The EDPB can 
equally enact such binding decisions to resolve disputes regarding which authority should 
be designated the lead authority152 or where a competent authority adopts specified 
actions without seeking the opinion of the EDPB, or subsequently overlooks its opinion 
once given.153 The decision of the EDPB is addressed to the lead supervisory authority 
and all other supervisory authorities concerned and is binding on all of them.154 These 
binding decisions of the EDPB are ordinarily adopted by a two-thirds majority of EDPB 
members.155  
The lead supervisory authority or, where relevant, the supervisory authority of the 
State where the complaint was lodged, must then adopt a final decision based on the 
binding decision of the EDPB within one month of notification of the EDPB’s 
decision.156 The final decision of the supervisory authority must refer to the EDPB’s 
decision and attach this decision to its final decision.157 This final decision is adopted in 
accordance with the division of labour foreseen for supervisory authorities by Articles 
60(7) to 60(9) of the GDPR. As such, the lead authority must communicate a final 
decision to the data controller or processor based on an EDPB decision while the 
supervisory authority of the complainant must notify the final decision to it, in keeping 
with Article 77(2) GDPR.158 However, where a final decision dismisses a complaint in 
whole or in part, the supervisory authority of the complainant takes responsibility for 
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notifying this dismissal (or partial dismissal) to both the complainant and the relevant 
data controller or processor.159  
Articles 57 and 58, setting out the tasks and powers of supervisory authorities 
respectively, continue to indicate that each supervisory authority is responsible for 
monitoring and enforcing the GDPR’s application on its own territory160 and that each 
supervisory authority is entitled, as part of its corrective powers, to impose an 
administrative fine pursuant to Article 83 GDPR or other corrective measures.161 Yet, 
once the consistency mechanism is engaged it is solely the lead authority that addresses a 
final decision to the data controller. It would also therefore seem logical to assume, 
although not expressly stipulated by the GDPR that it is solely that lead authority that can 
impose an administrative fine on the data controller (and therefore that each supervisory 
authority that is an addressee of the EDPB decision cannot impose an administrative fine 
on its own territory). Given the enhanced administrative fines foreseen by the 
Regulation162, which are arguably now criminal in nature as a result of their severity, one 
could query whether the imposition of sanctions by multiple Member States would 
comply with the principle of ne bis in idem. Pursuant to this principle, set out in Article 
50 of the EU Charter, ‘[n]o one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal 
proceedings for an offence for which he or she has already been finally acquitted or 
convicted within the Union in accordance with the law.’ The GDPR does however make 
explicit the remedies it offers to affected individuals, who can exercise their right to legal 
redress against the lead or relevant supervisory authority as this final decision is legally 
binding.163 In such circumstances, the supervisory authority must simply forward the 
decision of the EDPB which preceded its final decision to the relevant judicial 
authority.164  
It can thus be seen that while supervisory authorities remain competent to tackle 
‘purely internal’ data processing problems, the consistency mechanism ensures that 
cross-border data processing problems are ‘Europeanised’. Such problems are dealt with 
by endeavouring to reach consensus between the various relevant supervisory authorities 
and where consensus is wanting, by a binding decision of the EDPB that is then 
subsequently notified by the lead authority, or another competent authority where 
relevant. One could therefore conclude that the interpretation and application of the law 
has become centralised and thus to a large extent harmonised. The driving force behind 
this centralised harmonisation will be the newly created EDPB. The implications of this 
new institutional landscape and new dynamic for data protection governance shall now be 
considered.  
 
B. The consequences of ‘Europeanisation’  
 
This centralisation is likely to have significant legal and practical ramifications. Three in 
particular can be emphasised. First, although the GPDR continues to assert the 
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independence of national supervisory authorities, this centralisation will reduce the 
existing independence of these authorities. Secondly, as this centralisation alters the 
current institutional and legal balance between the EU and Member States in the field of 
data protection it may raise issues of subsidiarity and national identity. Finally, the 
creation of the new EDPB as an independent EU agency with the power to enact binding 
decisions on normative rather than purely technical issues may raise queries regarding its 
accountability and democratic legitimacy.  
 
1. Curtailing the ‘complete independence’ of national supervisory authorities  
 
To date, national supervisory authorities have had horizontal independence vis-à-vis 
domestic public institutions, private parties and their international counterparts. 
Supervisory authorities have also enjoyed vertical independence vis-à-vis EU institutions 
and bodies: as discussed above, neither the EDPS nor the Article 29 Working Party could 
bind a national supervisory authority through its decision-making. If the European 
Commission deemed a decision of a supervisory authority to be unlawful and 
incompatible with the EU data protection rules, it could merely initiate infringement 
proceedings against that Member State for breach of its obligations to respect EU law.165 
Only national courts could annul decisions of a national supervisory authority on the 
grounds that they were incompatible with EU law, or where that assessment raised 
questions regarding the interpretation (or validity) of EU data protection law they could 
refer preliminary questions to the Court of Justice.166  
The EDPB’s ability to address binding decisions to supervisory authorities 
therefore alters the existing legal balance, for instance, by rendering largely redundant the 
Commission’s competence to initiate infringement proceedings against a State for the 
failure of one of its organs to respect EU law. Given that national supervisory authorities 
will be required to respect the terms of a binding EDPB decision in all contentious cross-
border disputes, there will be less scope for such a breach of EU data protection law in 
the first instance.  
However, these new EDPB powers will also alter the extent of the independence 
of supervisory authority decision-making. The Article 29 Working Party warned against 
this possibility suggesting that consistency should not ‘encroach upon the independence 
of national supervisory authorities and should leave the responsibilities of the different 
actors where they belong’.167 However, as Hijmans notes, when the EDPB uses its 
binding powers ‘the national DPAs are no longer sovereign to ensure the control of the 
EU rules on data protection’.168 Supervisory authorities will, henceforth, take direct and 
binding instructions from the EDPB thereby limiting their vertical independence vis-à-vis 
this EU agency. Therefore, a supervisory authority may be compelled to enact a final 
decision based on an EDPB decision and address this to a data controller or processor 
even if it disagrees with the substantive findings of that decision. In such circumstances, 
the only option for a supervisory authority to assert its independence vis-à-vis the EDPB 
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would be to ignore its binding opinion and address a distinct final decision to the alleged 
wrongdoer. The GDPR does not envisage such a situation. However, in such 
circumstances, the European Commission could take infringement proceedings against 
the Member State concerned. It is unclear whether other relevant supervisory authorities 
could take any legal action to enforce the EDPB’s decision while such proceedings are 
pending. This scenario also reveals that the new consistency and cooperation mechanisms 
continue to require a limitation of the horizontal independence of supervisory authorities 
vis-à-vis one another by putting an end to the regulatory competition discussed above.  
In light of these curtailments to the independence of supervisory authorities, an 
‘essential element’ of the right to data protection, one might query whether this new 
governance mechanism is compliant with EU primary law. However, if a teleological 
approach is taken to the interpretation and application of the criterion of independence 
the changes brought about by the GDPR are ostensibly compatible with primary law. The 
independence requirement is ‘not an end in itself but rather a means to achieving higher-
level objectives’.169 Szydlo suggests that independence enhances efficiency as 
independent supervisory authorities have ‘incomparably greater chances to perform their 
tasks efficiently’ as they can ‘focus solely on their main mission (without dispersing their 
resources across activities not related to data protection), and may autonomously set their 
own priorities’.170 However, the Court has emphasised the role of independence in 
ensuring effective and reliable individual rights protection and has suggested that 
independence ‘must be interpreted in light of that aim’.171 As discussed above, the 
current lack of substantive and procedural harmonisation of data protection law is leading 
to regulatory competition between supervisory authorities and an unequal level of data 
protection throughout the EU. This plurality of national administrative practices could, as 
Zemánek suggests, jeopardise the ‘entire effet utile of the Union regulatory framework’ in 
a manner that is incompatible with the protection offered by the EU Charter.172 The Court 
has equally, when interpreting other provisions of EU data protection law, repeatedly 
emphasised the need to interpret data protection requirements in a manner which 
enhances the effectiveness of these rules.173 It is therefore suggested that while the 
centralisation of data protection governance will limit the independence of national 
supervisory authorities, this centralisation is compatible with EU law as independence 
must be interpreted in a teleological way that enhances the effectiveness of individual 
rights protection.    
 
2. The compatibility of the EDPB with general principles of EU law  
 
Subsidiarity is a general principle of EU law, provided for by Article 5(3) TEU. 
According to this principle, the EU shall only act in areas which do no fall within its 
exclusive competence ‘if and so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States’ and can be better achieved at Union level 
because of their scale and effects. In Commission v Germany, Germany had argued that it 
                                                     
169 See note 44 above, p 1815.  
170 Ibid, p 1816.  
171 See note 44 above, para 41.  
172 See note 49 above, p 1766.  
173 See note 114 above, paras 30,34, 38, 53, 58 and 84.  
would be contrary to the principle of subsidiarity to require it to abandon an 
administrative system for data protection that had been established almost 30 years 
previously. In support of its claim it relied upon paragraph 7 of the Protocol on 
Subsidiarity and Proportionality, which provides that ‘care should be taken to respect 
well established national arrangements and the organisation and working of Member 
States’ legal systems.174 The Court however rejected this argument simply reiterating that 
the requirement that supervisory authorities are free from State scrutiny does not go 
beyond what it is necessary to achieve the Treaty objectives.175 Balthasar suggested that 
the Court’s disregard for the principle of subsidiarity and the strict interpretation of 
‘independence’ led to concerns that independent supervisory authorities were ‘only a first 
step to direct administration by Union authorities, and therefore a political aim not fully 
backed by the Treaties’.176 Similarly, Chiti notes that the process of agencification 
‘directly and indirectly influences the structure and functioning of national administrative 
systems’.177 
Nevertheless, although the EDPB may bring us one step closer to such ‘direct 
administration by Union authorities’, very few Member States took action pursuant to the 
‘Subsidiarity Protocol’178 to protest against this development. The Commission’s original 
proposal provided the Commission with extensive powers of intervention vis-à-vis 
national supervisory authorities, such as the power to compel the supervisory authority to 
suspend the adoption of a decision179 or to enact implementing acts to overrule a 
supervisory authority.180 Yet, despite this extensive interference by the Commission with 
the independence of national supervisory authorities only one national parliament (the 
Swedish) and four national parliamentary chambers181 opposed the proposal. It is 
possible that given that the EDPB is to replace the existing and well-established Article 
29 Working Party Member States viewed this governance development as a minor one, 
despite the extensive powers of the EDPB.  
Equally, the EDPB’s intergovernmental (or representative) composition may help 
to alleviate subsidiarity concerns by providing all supervisory authorities with a voice and 
a vote at the EDPB table. Indeed, doubt has been cast as to whether such representative 
bodies can truly be independent of their ‘home’ constituencies182 and, unlike other 
independent agencies which are ‘acting in the Union interest alone’ or ‘in the sole interest 
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of the Union’183, there is no such reference in the GDPR regarding the EDPB. Indeed, 
Busuioc suggests that groups of national supervisors could thwart agency rule-making 
and queries ‘[w]ho safeguards and polices that members of the board of supervisors act in 
the sole interest of the Union rather than act as vessels for a variety of national 
interests?’.184   
 It is important to recall that despite over two decades of data protection 
legislation in the EU, there remains a lack of consensus regarding the normative 
objectives of this legislation and its place within the broader framework of the digital 
economy and digital rights. In other fields of EU law, institutional design decisions have 
exposed the ‘deep-set constitutional, institutional and political fault-lines’185 which 
underpin the relevant system: data protection law is unlikely to be any different. The 
EDPB’s intergovernmental composition is therefore equally likely to lead to 
‘coordination problems’. In particular, it would seem likely that ‘policy issues will arise 
at EU level[s] before they have solidified and been coordinated at national levels’.186 The 
EDPB will therefore function as a driver to force consensus, irrespective of whether this 
reflects the national identity of the Member States concerned. Indeed, Zemánek already 
speaks of ‘normative permeability’ in this field as a result of the dialogue between 
national supervisory authorities. He distinguishes this dialogue from that taking place in 
sectoral administrative agencies, suggesting that it goes further than a ‘narrow 
“expertocratic” self-governing approach, and detects rather the idea underlining the 
cooperative partnership as a part of the European constitutional union, which is based on 
shared values’.187 This observation forces one to consider a further potential concern 
regarding the activities of an independent EDPB: in other sectors, the use of ‘independent 
regulatory agencies’ and centralised boards is ordinarily limited to technical matters, or in 
normative areas agencies tend to exercise restricted functions188, whereas in the data 
protection context the EDPB is equipped with extensive powers to engage in an 
inherently normative decision-making field. This, in turn, may lead to concerns regarding 
the democratic legitimacy of the EDPB.     
 
3. The democratic legitimacy of the EDPB  
 
EU agencies may be defined as ‘specialized, non-majoritarian bodies, established by 
secondary legislation, which exercise public authority and are institutionally separate 
                                                     
183 Ibid, fn 44.  
184 Ibid, p 121.  
185 N Moloney, ‘Institutional Governance and Capital Markets Union: Incrementalism or “Big Bang”’ 
ECFR 2/2016 376, 384.   
186 See note 27 above, p 283.  
187 See note 49 above, p 1767.  
188 For instance, the purpose of the ‘European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights’ is to ‘provide the 
relevant institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Community and its Member States when 
implementing Community law with assistance and expertise relating to fundamental rights in order to 
support them when they take measures or formulate courses of action within their respective spheres of 
competence to fully respect fundamental rights’. Council Regulation (EC) No 168/2007 of 15 February 
2007 establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights’ [2007] OJ L53/1. The Agency thus 
‘follows the model of a European information and coordination agency’. A Hinarejos, ‘A Missed 
Opportunity: the Fundamental Rights Agency and the Euro Area Crisis’ (2016) 22(1) European Law 
Journal 61, 63.  
from the EU Institutions and are endowed with legal personality’.189 Following the 
creation of two independent informational agencies in 1975, there was a lull in the 
establishment of agencies until two further waves of agency-creation in the 1990s and 
2000s.190 At present, there are over 30 ‘decentralised agencies’, that have been 
established to ‘perform technical and scientific tasks that help the EU institutions 
implement policies and take decisions’.191 These agencies have been described as a 
‘relatively new attempt to cope with societal challenges that elude traditional models of 
governance’.192 It is possible to distinguish between EU agencies from a functional 
perspective, and agencies could be said to sit on a spectrum between information-
providing agencies, at one end, and quasi-regulatory agencies, at the other.193 In between 
these two extremes there are agencies which ensure operational cooperation between 
authorities and decision-making agencies. While the legal basis for the establishment of 
some EU agencies is questionable194, and although the creation of the EDPB is not 
foreseen by the Treaties195, Article 16(2) TFEU does provide that compliance with the 
data protection rules ‘shall be subject to the control of independent authorities’ without 
further specifying whether these authorities should be national or supranational or both.   
The Court has had the opportunity to assess the legality of delegating EU 
institutional powers to agencies on numerous occasions. In the seminal Meroni196 
judgment, the Court laid out a doctrine which remains, formally at least, good law 
today.197 Pursuant to the Meroni doctrine, only clearly defined, executive powers can be 
delegated under the Treaty while discretionary powers cannot be delegated. This doctrine 
has been interpreted to mean that  
 
the setting up of Community offices endowed with legal personality may be 
considered legitimate under the Treaty only if necessary in order to carry out the 
objectives connected to the Community powers and does not imply any 
delegation of powers involving a real margin of discretion.198  
Agencies are therefore lawful provided they exercise non-discretionary powers and do 
not adopt acts of a regulatory nature.199 This coincides with the rationale for EU agencies 
– that by delegating technical tasks to those with expertise, administrative efficiency can 
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be enhanced.200 However, the Meroni doctrine has ostensibly become increasingly 
marginalised following recent legal and practical developments. From a legal perspective, 
the Court reiterated in Romano that the legislature was prohibited from empowering a 
body other than the Commission to ‘adopt acts having the force of law’.201 However, in 
its more recent ‘Short Selling’ judgment202, the Court rejected the UK government’s 
argument that one of the ESAs (the European Securities Market Authority – the ESMA) 
had been given broad discretionary tasks, breaching the Meroni (and Romano) limits. The 
Court acknowledged that under ‘strictly circumscribed circumstances’ the ESMA is 
required to adopt measures of general application but held that the provision setting out 
this requirement is not at odds with the Romano judgment. The Court recalled that ‘the 
institutional framework established by the TFEU, in particular the first paragraph of 
Article 263 TFEU and Article 277 TFEU, expressly permits Union bodies, offices and 
agencies to adopt acts of general application’.203  
From a practical perspective, it is ‘extremely difficult to define a clear typology 
for the classification of each non-majoritarian agency in a homogenous category’.204 
However, as Busuioc highlights, the quantitative and qualitative change in agencification 
reached its peak in 2010 following the creation of three new agencies in the financial 
sector (the European Supervisory Authorities, or ESAs).205 These ESAs ‘break the 
mould’ as a result of the heavy emphasis on their independence as well as their powers to 
‘direct binding decisions to national supervisory authorities as well as to overrule them’ 
in exceptional circumstances.206 Although the EDPB can be distinguished from these 
ESAs in various ways (for instance, unlike the ESAs the EDPB does not have the power 
to issue decisions directly to individual financial institutions in a member state), the 
EDPB could be said to mark a further significant step in this existing ‘agencification’. 
Chiti suggested, in 2009, that European agencies are a ‘peculiar organizational 
arrangement, distinct from other contiguous models of the EU administration’, including 
EU independent authorities.207 He therefore suggested that even ‘those EU agencies 
expressly qualified as independent by establishing regulations’ are not independent as a 
result of their direct and indirect influence from the Commission and the private sector.208 
It is suggested, however, that the EDPB marks a departure from Chiti’s framework as a 
result of the extent and nature of its powers.  
First, the powers of the EDPB, once the dispute resolution mechanism in the 
GDPR is invoked, are extensive. This mechanism is engaged, as outlined above, when 
consensus cannot be reached between supervisory authorities regarding the designation of 
the lead supervisory authority209 or the substance of a decision with transnational 
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implications.210 Pursuant to Article 64, any supervisory authority, the Chair of the EDPB 
or the Commission can request that ‘any matter of general application or producing 
effects in more than one Member States be examined by the Board’.211 The EDPB then 
adopts an opinion on that matter.212  However, where the relevant supervisory authority 
indicates to the EDPB that it does not intend to follow its opinion, in whole or in part, the 
dispute resolution mechanism is engaged213 and the EDPB can issue a decision that binds 
the supervisory authority.214 It would therefore appear that, unlike other EU agencies, the 
decision-making powers of the EDPB include, but are not limited to, individual decision-
making (ie applying general rules to specific cases) but extend to ‘any matter of general 
application’ and are therefore regulatory in nature. Moreover, the EDPB will also act as a 
‘quasi rule-maker’ as it has the power to adopt soft law measures (guidelines, 
recommendations and best practices) of its own initiative or at the request of an EDPB 
member or the Commission on ‘any question covering the application of [the] 
Regulation’.215  
Secondly, the nature of the power exercised by the EDPB is also noteworthy. It is 
suggested that the EDPB shall engage in normative, rather than neutral technical or 
scientific, decision-making. The extent to which the activities of independent regulatory 
agencies can be neutral has been questioned.216 Shapiro, for instance, highlights that even 
informational agencies – the least interventionist form of agency from a functional 
perspective – can have political influence for ‘as soon as information becomes highly 
relevant to policy outcomes, the information and the information gatherers cease to be 
defined as neutral and objective and are redefined as part of the political struggle’.217 
Indeed, many areas in which independent agencies operate are linked to long-term 
policy-making objectives (for instance energy policy is linked to environmental 
protection) and therefore necessarily involve ‘public policy design and management in 
one way or another’. 218 Florio argues that the balancing of policy objectives is a core 
function of government and cannot be delegated to independent regulators alone.219 The 
tensions between data protection policy and other societal interests, such as innovation, 
and rights, such as freedom of expression and freedom of information, are well-
documented. 
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Normative decision-making is therefore inevitable in a hybrid policy area like 
data protection in which the regulated ‘asset’ – personal data – is both of economic and 
dignitary value. Szydlo implies that there is an ‘axiological convergence’ between data 
protection and other areas in which sector-specific regulators operate as a result of this 
nexus between economic and social regulation in data protection law. This, in turn, he 
suggests ‘might justify the convergence between these two kinds of authorities on the 
institutional plane’.220 However, the data protection governance system unlike, for 
instance the governance system for telecommunications or financial services, is an 
integral part of the ‘emerging fundamental rights architecture’ of the EU.221 While data 
protection was initially enacted as a regulatory internal market policy, its legal basis has 
now been decoupled from the internal market and it is recognised as a fundamental right 
in the EU legal order. Supervisory authorities are therefore the ‘guardians of those 
fundamental rights and freedoms’ protected by EU data protection law and thus the 
existence of supervisory authorities is an essential component of human rights 
protection.222 It follows that when decision-making formerly conducted by supervisory 
authorities is conducted by the EDPB it too will be acting as part of this fundamental 
rights architecture. Indeed, one rationale advanced for the existence of the EDPB is to 
render the protection of the right to data protection more effective. The so-called ‘Paris 
Principles’ of the UN223, which set out recommendations for national human rights 
institutions, recognise that human rights institutions should be composed in an 
independent and pluralistic manner. However, these principles do not elaborate on the 
powers that independent human rights institutions should exercise. While some other EU 
Agencies also pursue human rights objectives, for instance the Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions or the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, 
the nature and extent of the powers of these agencies are distinct. For instance, as 
Hinarejos notes the EU Fundamental Rights Agency ‘follows the model of a European 
information and coordination agency’and has several significant limitations that curtail its 
effectiveness, including that it cannot issue binding decisions and does not set its own 
agenda.224   
The key concern regarding EU agencies is that they ‘operate at arm’s length from 
traditional controls and cannot easily be held accountable for their actions’.225 Moreover, 
as has been outlined, the EDPB is qualitatively distinct from other agencies as a result of 
the extent and nature of its powers. While the Meroni doctrine was enacted by the Court 
to ensure that the delegation of executive decision-making by the Commission was 
compatible with the principle of institutional balance, and thus to ensure some level of 
accountability, as Curtin has highlighted this principal-agent model of accountability 
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does not capture the power dynamics agencies entail.226 Rather, as Dehousse suggests, 
‘Europeanization would be a better description of the process in which powers are 
transferred vertically (from national to the EU level) rather than horizontally (from 
Community institutions to specialized agencies).’227  
The challenge will therefore be to ensure the accountability and legitimacy of this 
Europeanised agency. The EDPB itself, like national supervisory authorities, must ‘act 
independently’228 and ‘in the performance of its tasks or the exercise of its powers, 
neither seek nor take instructions from anybody’.229 In Commission v Germany Germany 
had argued that the principle of democracy precludes a broad interpretation of 
supervisory authority independence as this principle requires the administration to be 
subject to the instructions of government which then, in turn, answers to parliament.230 
However, the Court rejected this argument stating that the principle of democracy does 
‘not preclude the existence of public authorities outside the classic hierarchical 
administration’. It highlighted that supervisory authorities remain regulated by law, 
subject to judicial review and are overseen by Parliament.231 The principles of 
accountability and transparency therefore ‘require that a supervisory authority be 
answerable for its actions’.232 The EDPB shall therefore be subject to the general 
democratic checks on EU agencies: its decisions can be appealed by EU Institutions and 
Members States as well as by directly and individually concerned actors pursuant to 
Article 263(1) TFEU; it is subject to a check of legality by the Commission in accordance 
with the Commission’s general oversight powers under Article 17(1) TEU and the 
EDPB’s annual report must be made public and transmitted to the European Parliament, 
the Council and the Commission.233 This report must include a review of specified 
guidelines, recommendations and best practices it has issued as well as of the binding 
decisions it has enacted under the dispute resolution mechanism.234 Moreover, although 
the Commission has no voting rights on the EDPB, it is entitled to designate a 
representative to the EDPB, to participate in its meetings and the Chair of the Board 
communicates the activities of the EDPB to the Commission.235 This role for the 
Commission appears difficult to reconcile with the EDPB’s institutional independence 
however it will enable the Commission to exercise its general powers of oversight more 
effectively.  
Thus, one might conclude that despite its questionable compatibility with the Meroni 
doctrine given the nature and the extent of its powers, the EDPB shall be subject to 
oversight by the EU Institutions. While for some the new governance system brought 
about by the GDPR will therefore represent the beginning of a ‘bureaucratic network in 
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being, composed of national and Union bodies outside any democratic control’236, others 
may simply argue that this ‘Europeanisation’ or more ‘integrated administration’237 of 
EU data protection law is necessary in order to increase Member State cooperation in this 
transnational field of law and the EDPB shall act as a ‘catalyst of compliance’. 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION  
 
Despite the increasing importance and prominence of substantive data protection law, the 
governance of data protection law has been largely overlooked to date: data protection 
laws have been under-enforced and the data protection governance structure has not 
attracted much doctrinal attention. This paper claims that the current governance structure 
will be ‘Europeanised’, and thus radically reformed by the GDPR. In order to illustrate 
the extent of this reform, it proceeded in two parts. First, it illustrated that the current data 
protection governance system is characterised by its enforcement by independent 
supervisory authorities. This system is also, however, characterised by a lack of 
centralised coordination of the activities of these independent supervisory authorities. In 
the absence of such vertical oversight, cross-border cases involving multiple supervisory 
authorities are governed by ad hoc mechanisms while there is evident regulatory arbitrage 
between supervisory authorities in contentious cases.  
 This paper asserts that these shortcomings of the current decentralised system of 
enforcement will be rectified by the ‘Europeanisation’ of data protection law, in 
particular the creation of the EDPB – a centralised agency that will provide co-ordination 
and coherence to the actions of supervisory authorities through binding mechanisms. 
However, this process of ‘Europeanisation’ will, it is suggested, pose other challenges for 
data protection governance. First, ‘Europeanisation’ will necessarily curtail the vertical 
independence of supervisory authorities vis-à-vis the EU. Its compatibility with the 
primary law requirement for supervisory authority independence may thus be questioned. 
This paper suggests however that a purposive approach is taken to the interpretation of 
the independence criterion: independence enhances the effectiveness of the data 
protection rules. As the creation of the EDPB is designed to enhance the effectiveness of 
these rules also, and will thus contribute to this over-arching aim, it should not be viewed 
as an unlawful interference with supervisory authority independence. The EDPB must 
also sit in a broader EU law context and, in this regard, it challenges existing principles of 
subsidiarity and national identity. Indeed, ‘Europeanisation’ through a centralised 
institutional framework will lead to ‘Europeanisation’ in the second sense – in terms of 
its impact on national structures and policies. The democratic legitimacy and 
accountability of the EDPB might also be questioned, particularly in light of the Meroni 
doctrine. The EDPB differs in some respects from other agencies as it represents the 
Europeanisation of existing national powers rather than the delegation of EU powers. 
Nevertheless, it is also suggested that the EDPB represents a further step in the 
‘agencification’ process: the EDPB shall exercise quasi-regulatory powers and, crucially, 
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its decisions are not of a purely technical nature but instead require normative decision-
making. This institutional ‘Europeanisation’ is therefore set to change EU data protection 
governance in a drastic manner. The ‘domestic consequences’ for Member States of this 
centralised governance structure – ‘Europeanisation’ as it is most widely understood – are 
as of yet unknown. However, the impact of this new governance system may go beyond 
structural and policy changes as European data protection values have the potential to 
shape discourse and identities at the domestic level if internalised.  
 
 
 
 
 
